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Made	in	the	UK:	Brexit	and	manufacturing	revisited
What	impact	will	Brexit	have	on	UK	manufacturing?	As	Bob	Hancké	points	out,	the	domestic	economic
effects	of	Brexit	are	dynamic,	not	static.	While	some	industries	will	be	devastated	by	Brexit,	resources
may	switch	to	other	areas	which,	in	theory,	could	thrive.	But	for	this	to	happen,	the	UK	needs	to	revamp
its	industrial	supply	chains,	which	are	dependent	on	close	links	to	European	manufacturers	that	will	be
hampered	by	a	hard	Brexit.
The	prevailing	line	on	Brexit	and	UK	manufacturing	runs	roughly	like	this:	unless	free	trade	in	goods	survives	the	EU-
UK	talks	–	something	that	looks	increasingly	unlikely	–	industry	will	quickly	pack	its	bags	and	decamp	to	locations	on
the	continent	from	where	it	can	continue	to	produce,	export	and	import	without	tariffs.	The	noises	coming	from	some
of	the	bigger	manufacturing	companies	in	the	UK,	such	as	Airbus,	BMW	and	Nissan,	leave	little	doubt	about	the
urgency	that	these	large	companies	associate	with	the	free	trade	element	in	Brexit.	Before	long,	Brexit	UK	will	be	an
industrial	desert	–	which,	according	to	some	senior	government	ministers	it	already	is	anyway	(so	why	bother?).
A	quite	nuanced	recent	article	in	The	Guardian	takes	issue	with	this	line	of	thinking	and	examines	the	problem	from	a
more	dynamic	perspective.	It	correctly	points	out	that	investment	horizons	usually	cover	the	better	part	of	a	decade:
in	the	car	industry,	for	example,	models	change	moderately	every	five	years,	give	or	take	a	year,	and	airplanes	fly	on
an	even	longer	cycle.	Up-front	investments	have	to	be	written	off,	preferably	over	a	large	number	of	units,	which
produces	a	significant	level	of	inertia.	The	article	concludes	that	after	Brexit,	UK	manufacturing	will	slowly	wilt:	R&D
will	gradually	be	shipped	overseas	and	future	investment	will	be	diverted	as	well,	with	the	expected	effect	on	British
manufacturing.
A	manufacturing-free	zone?
The	birthplace	of	modern	industry	would	become	a	manufacturing-free	zone.	This	is	certainly	a	very	plausible
scenario,	given	where	we	are	now	with	the	talks	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	going	nowhere.	But	my	nagging	sense
is	that	it	is	one	of	two	possible	scenarios	–	and	the	other	one	has	at	least	as	big	a	chance,	given	the	medium-term
constraints	for	companies	if	we	take	this	logic	further.
Let’s	spell	out	this	slightly	more	positive	scenario.	Most	assembly	plants,	for	cars,	aerospace	parts	or	white	goods,
have	a	minimum	shelf	life	of	ten	years	or	more	–	lest	the	owner	is	willing	to	take	a	massive	loss	on	the	investment.
Now,	most	companies	with	plants	in	Britain	are	not	very	rich	companies.	Renault-Nissan,	Airbus	and	BMW	certainly
do	well,	but	not	to	the	extent	that	they	can	simply	write	off	losses	related	to	plant	closures:	the	investment	itself,	the
redundancies	(and	foregone	training	costs),	the	collapse	of	supplier	networks	which	might	be	echoed	by	problems	in
the	home	plants	and	the	reputational	costs.
In	fact,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	many	large	manufacturing	companies	that	can	take	such	a	blow;	their	profits	and	cash
reserves	are	too	low	for	such	a	shock,	and	if	they	could	take	it,	they	would	almost	certainly	starve	other	operations	of
much-needed	investment.	Closing	a	plant	in	Britain	is	not	a	good	idea.
Assuming	that	most	of	these	operations	remain	open	as	manufacturing	plants	for	the	foreseeable	future,	what	about
the	parts	supplied	by	other	companies	that	go	into	the	final	product?	Modern	cars,	for	example,	are	essentially
combinations	of	complex	systems	manufactured	by	companies	that	many	of	us	have	never	heard	of,	bolted	together
in	the	final	assembly	plants	that	sport	the	badge.	Ditto	for	most	other	industries,	where	vertical	disintegration	has
reduced	the	value	added	that	Bauknecht	itself	put	into	its	induction	stove,	Zanussi	in	its	refrigerators	or	Magimix	in	its
mixers.
Crucial	components
For	the	car	industry,	more	than	75%	of	the	value	added,	often	approaching	90%,	is	produced	outside	and	bought	in.
This	changes	the	second	part	of	the	Brexit	‘should	I	stay	or	should	I	go’	question.
Concentrate	on	the	car	industry:	about	half	the	parts	in	an	average	car	cross	the	Channel	a	few	times	before	they
end	up	in	the	final	product.	This	is	a	simple	effect	of	the	fact	that	industries	have	a	tendency	to	cluster	in	relatively
well-specified	regions	because	others	are	there	who	produce	public	goods	such	as	skills	and	general	technological
know-how:	southern	Germany,	Switzerland,	northern	Italy,	Catalonia,	Flanders,	southern	Denmark,	etc.
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About	a	year	ago,	The	Guardian	followed	the	crankshaft	in	the	Mini	assembled	in	Oxford	on	its	journey	from	stand-
alone	part	to	completed	car	and	discovered	that	it	crossed	the	Channel	three	times	–	and	then	once	more	in	the
finished	product	for	a	customer	in	Germany	or	France.	If	each	of	these	crossings	incurs	a	10%	tariff,	the	car	will
become,	say,	30%	more	expensive.	Not	an	easy	cost	to	absorb	in	a	competitive	industry.	If	the	German	luxury
brands	would	find	it	hard	to	accommodate	that,	imagine	what	it	would	mean	for	mass	producers	with	their	razor-thin
margins.
If,	under	a	relatively	hard	Brexit,	the	final	assembly	plants	stay,	no	other	sustainable	option	remains	for	them,
therefore,	than	to	reconstitute	local	supply	chains.	Instead	of	crossing	the	Channel	three	times,	the	crankshaft	could
cross	the	Thames	twice,	not	incur	any	tariffs	along	the	way	and	become	part	of	a	Mini	to	be	exported.	That	exported
car	might	still	be	taxed	more	than	today,	but	probably	not	that	much,	since	more	BMWs	are	sold	in	the	UK	than	Minis
in	the	EU;	it	would	cut	down	on	paperwork	and	possible	delays	that	upset	the	now	industry-standard	(but	very	fragile)
just-in-time	production	systems	where	parts	are	delivered	when	needed	and	not	in	large	batches	once	a	week	or	so;
and	it	saves	the	company	a	multitude	of	other	tangible	and	intangible	costs.
A	fork	in	the	road
The	combination	of	these	two	possibilities	changes	the	Brexit	equation	dramatically,	at	least	for	manufacturing.
Instead	of	a	looming	apocalypse,	re-industrialisation	of	those	regions	that	house	a	sophisticated,	advanced
manufacturing	sector	becomes	a	possibility.	The	economics	of	the	manufacturing	sectors,	with	their	long	time
horizons	and	fragmented	production	systems,	nudge	them	there.	But	economics	alone	is	not	enough	–	else	we
wouldn’t	even	be	considering	Brexit.
It	will	also	require	a	reconfiguration	of	different	parts	of	the	value	chain;	an	industrial	policy	to	organise	technology
transfer;	a	regional	policy	to	develop	support	systems	including	Chambers	of	Commerce,	local	development
agencies	and	broad	associations	of	stakeholders;	and	the	development	of	sophisticated	training	systems	for	both
engineering	skills	and	shop-floor	workers.	Many	of	these	issues	were	addressed	in	the	government’s
recent	Industrial	Strategy	White	Paper,	which	highlighted	the	need	to	support	domestic	suppliers	after	Brexit.
Business	alone	cannot	organise	these	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	ranging	from	simple	inability	to	complex	collective
action	problems	associated	with	the	production	of	public	goods.	And	some	sectors,	especially	those	where	a
reintegration	of	supply	chains	is	difficult,	may	go	to	the	wall	as	the	inevitable	consequence	of	a	hard	Brexit:	it	is	hard
to	imagine	textiles,	ceramics	or	cutlery	will	survive	a	tariff	wall.	All	this	helps	understand	the	mild	Brexit	panic	in
business	circles.	But	government	can	provide	the	necessary	help	here,	and	it	should	do	so.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	the	New	European	Trade	Unions	Forum.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not
the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:
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